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Intr oduction
Electricity demand traditionally exhibits a substantial peak during a small number of hours each day.
Policymakers are aw are of the potential efficiency savings that may be generated from a shift in energy consumption aw ay from peak times. Smart meters, in conjunction w ith time-of-use (TOU)
pricing, can facilitate an improvement in energy efficiency by providing consumers w ith enhanced information about electricity consumption and cost s, and thereby encourage a shift aw ay from consumption during peak hours.
In the EU, a number of recent pieces of legislation have promoted the use of smart metering, Numerous other countries have experimented w ith t he use of smart meters (e.g US, Canada and Denmark) 2 , and there is a grow ing international literature analysing the impact of TOU tariffs on residential and commercial electricity consumption. The availability of high-quality data on a large and representative sample allow s us to estimate the impact of TOU pricing on electricity consumption in Ireland for the first time. 3 Ireland is an interesting case study as much of the international literature focuses on the US w here the use of air conditioning for residential use is common. As in Ireland there is no demand of air conditioning during the summer, the trial results
show the impact of different TOU and stimuli on residential electricity demand net of the air conditioning effects, w hich accounts for a large part of the household responses in t he US (Faruqui and Sergici, 2009 ). In addition, the data also allow us to investigate the impact of a variety of 1 There w ere t hree dist inct st rands t o t he w ork; t echnology trials, cust omer behaviour t rials and a cost -benefit analysis for t he nat ional roll-out of sm art m eters (Comm ission for Energy Regulation, 2011a).
2 See w ww .ont ario-hydro.com / index.php?page=current_rat es and w w w .ct energyinfo.com / dpuc_t im e_of_day_rat es.ht m [last accessed 01 Sept em ber 2011] for exam ple. Darby (2006) m aint ain that TOU pricing is m ost com m on in part s of t he w orld wit h sum mer and w inter peaks allied w it h supply const raint s: California, Ont ario, the nort h east ern st at es of t he US and part s of Aust ralia. For evidence on Denm ark see Gleerup et al. (2010) . 3 While Gans et al. (2011) analyse the im pact of enhanced feedback on electricit y consum pt ion in Nort hern Ireland, t hey focus just on a group of households w ho w ere already cognisant of t heir electricit y consum ption due t o t heir choice of t he prepayment option of payment . The ext ent t o w hich t heir result s are generalisable t o ot her household t ypes is debat eable. information stimuli on electricity consumption. Finally, limited socio-economic information on the participating households is also available. 4 The first aim of this paper is therefore to disentangle the effects of the different TOU tariffs (peak, day and night) on residential electricity 5 consumption during different times of the day. Our results
show that different information stimuli lead to differences in household responses during different times of the day. In particular, the presence of an IHD that indicates the quantity and cost of electricity consumed on a real-time basis leads households to contract their consumption during the peak hours, and the magnitude of the contraction increases as the ratio of peak to off-peak prices increases. How ever, the extent of the additional reduction in peak demand due to a steepening tariff schedule is very small in absolute terms. The other stimuli (i.e., bi-monthly and monthly paper billing) also give rise to reductions in peak demand w hen TOU tariffs are employed, but for them there is little evidence of further reductions as t he ratio of peak t o off-peak prices rises further.
Second, w e investigate the determinants of electricity consumption during different times of the day. We find that controlling for day of the w eek, public holidays, climatic conditions and household appliance ow nership, the presence of different TOU tariffs affects household electricity consumption during the peak hours, but does not lead to a significant change in electricity usage during the day and night periods.
Finally, w e examine the variation in our results across different socio-economic groups, as proxied by the highest level of education completed by the chief income earner of the household. We find that households w ith higher education levels respond to TOU tariffs during the peak period (consistent w ith the overall results noted above), but that households w ith low education levels are less responsive to TOU tariffs.
Section 2 discusses previous research in the area. Section 3 describes our data, w hile Section 4 outlines the methodology employed in this paper. Section 5 presents and discusses empirical results, w hile Section 6 summarises and concludes.
Liter atur e r eview
Estimates of the price elasticity of electricity demand in the residential sector can be very different depending on the type of data used (time-series, cross-section, panel), context (national, regional or local economy), size of the variation in price and time periods covered (see also Alberini et al., 2011) .
Here w e focus on studies that, similar to the approach used in this paper, use micro-data on households and that examine the impact of price and information stimuli on electricity demand. 4 As described in Sect ion 3, t he quality of t he dat a relating to household income w as poor, and as a result , t he educat ion level of t he chief incom e earner is used t o indicate household socio-econom ic st at us. 5 As explained in Sect ion 3, we concentrat e on resident ial cust om ers only in t his paper.
The extent to w hich price elasticities differ across population groups is a common focus of research in this area. Baker et al. (1989) use data from the British Family Expenditure Survey over the period [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] to analyse household expenditure on electricity, gas and other fuels. Prices are national averages. They find a significant ow n-price elasticity of -0.758 for electricity demand, with considerable variation in the estimated ow n-price elasticity across different household types (e.g., by presence of children, type of heating, income, et c.). Alberini et al. (2011) estimate price elasticities of energy (electricity and gas) demand using data on over 74,000 households in the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the US over the period 1997-2007. They report price elasticities of demand for electricity use that range from -0.67 to -0.86, w ith the elasticities slightly higher in poorer households.
As TOU pricing is becoming more common, so too are studies evaluating households' responses to TOU pricing. Bartusch et al. (2011) examine the impact of the introduction of a demand-based TOU tariff on a pilot basis to a group of 500 households in Sw eden. Using data before and after the introduction of the TOU tariff, they find that total electricity consumption declined by 11.1 per cent and 14.2 per cent in the first tw o years after the change to TOU pricing (w ith the size of the reductions higher in the winter months). They also find a shift in electricity demand from the peak to off-peak period of 0.8 and 1.2 percentage points in the first tw o years (w ith t he shift greater during the summer months). Filippini (2011) analyse electricity data at the city level for 22 Sw iss cities over the period 2000 to 2006. They find that the ow n-price elasticities vary betw een -0.80 and -0.89 during the peak period and betw een -0.90 and -0.95 during the off-peak period (positive cross-price elasticities imply that peak and off-peak electricity are substitutes). An earlier study, also using Swiss data, found similar results (Filippini, 1995) . M atsukaw a (2001) examine the impact of TOU pricing on residential electricity demand in Japan. The results show that (1) household response t o the high price of the peak period is relatively modest, and (2) the relative magnitudes of the price and selection effects (i.e., participation in the trial) depend on the ow nership of w ater heaters. Ham et al. (1997) discuss the importance of accounting for selection w hen using experimental data (the bias induced by voluntary participation in such initiatives is also discussed by Aubin et al., 1995) .
They measure the responsiveness of small commercial customers to TOU pricing using data from a TOU experiment conducted by Ontario Hydro. Participants w ere randomly assigned to control and treatment groups, but approximately half of the treatment group refused to participate. Allowing for selection has a significant impact on the parameter estimates. Nonetheless, they find a significant reduction of 15 per cent in electricity consumption w hen the peak period is relatively short in length (approximately 5 hours) and the peak/ off-peak price differential is approximately six to one. For the other tw o treatments, w here the length of the peak period is longer and the price differential is smaller, no significant reduction is observed. Ow n-price elasticities of demand are estimated to be -0.134 in the w inter and -0.114 in the summer.
A variant on TOU pricing is dynamic pricing, w hereby rates respond to critical periods of electricity use. In the US, critical periods occur typically during the top one percent of the hours of the year w here somew here betw een 9-17 percent of the annual peak demand is concentrated. It is very expensive to serve power during these critical periods and even a modest reduction in demand can be very cost -effective (Faruqui and Sergici, 2009 climate of zone 4. The average impact on normal w eekdays w as -4.7 percent, w ith a range across climate zones from -2.2 percent to -6.5 percent. They also found that households w ith central air conditioning w ere more price responsive and produced greater absolute and percentage reductions in peak-period energy use than did households w ithout air conditioning. TOU impacts w ere less significant, due in part t o the small sample size, w hile the information-only treatments w ere similarly insignificant.
As in our experiment, TOU pricing is often combined w ith various information stimuli. Darby (2006) reviews the literature on the impact of feedback (both direct in the form of meters or display monitors, and indirect in the form of frequent, accurate billing) on household energy use. She finds that overall the literature demonstrates that clear feedback is a necessary element in learning how to control fuel use more effectively over a long period of time and instantaneous direct feedback in combination w ith frequent, accurate billing (a form of indirect feedback) is needed as a basis for sustained demand reduction. There is some indication that high energy users may respond more than low users to direct feedback. In terms of indirect feedback, historic feedback (comparing w ith previous recorded periods of consumption) appears to be more effective than comparative or normative information (comparing w ith other households, or w ith a target figure).
6 All experim ent s are based on panel dat a, involving repeat ed m easurement s on a cross-sect ion of cust om ers.
Som e of t he cust omers are placed on t he dynamic pricing rat e (or rat es) and fall int o t he t reat ment group. Ot hers st ay on existing rat es and fall int o t he control group. Technically, t he cont rol group should be random ly chosen (Faruqui and Sergici, 2009 ). Gans et al. (2011) to examine the impact of demand management policies that provided information and offered minor incentives to customers (e.g., information leaflets w ith households' electricity bills). They find that t he introduction of information programs reduces long-term electricity usage by 7 per cent.
In a statistical analysis of the Irish data to w hich w e apply econometrics later in this paper, Commission for Energy Regulation (2011a) finds that application of TOU tariffs w ith a selection of informational stimuli reduce overall household electricity use by an average of 2.5 per cent and peak demand by 8.8 per cent. They also find that households w ith an IHD or w ith high pre-trial demand reduced demand more than others, but that increases in the ratio of peak to off-peak prices beyond the initial step tested do not lead to further statist ically significant reductions in demand. They conclude that demand is highly price inelastic.
Data
The residential component of the trial involved over 5,000 households (customers of Electric The keypad m et ers combine a rechargeable card control wit h an int eract ive display t hat allow s consumers t o easily monit or t heir elect ric usage and cost . In Novem ber 2010, t hey account ed for just over one-t hird of residential electricit y cust om ers. 8 At t he t im e of recruit ment (m id-2008), Electric Ireland cust om ers represent ed 100 per cent of resident ial electricit y cust om ers in Ireland (Com mission for Energy Regulat ion, 2011a). 9 We focus on resident ial electricit y participant s in t his paper, as t he publicly-released m icro-dat a relate only t o residential part icipant s in t he t rial. 10 Dat a collect ion st art ed earlier in 2009, but t he anonym ised dat aset provided t o researchers om it t ed data collect ed up t o 14 July due t o incom plet eness of t he sam ple.
Treatment households w ere randomly assigned to different TOU tariff groups and to different information stimuli groups. The allocation of treatment households betw een tariffs and information stimulus groups w as decided by the regulator at the end of 2009. In order to allocate the treated groups betw een different tariffs and information stimuli a principal component analysis w as applied to identify the main household characteristics and to optimally combine interest in energy reduction and usage profile. Given these combinations, the participants w ere randomly allocated to different treatment groups.
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Four TOU tariffs w ere tested. TOU prices referred to peak (17:00-18:59 M onday-Friday, excluding public holidays), day (08:00-16:59; 19:00-22:59 M onday-Friday, plus 17:00-18:59 public holidays, Saturday and Sunday) and night (23:00-07:59) periods (based on system demand peaks). A w eekend tariff w as also tested (w hereby the night rate applied all day Saturday and Sunday, with separate peak, day and night tariffs for w eekdays). In comparison w ith the initial flat-rate tariff, the electricity price associated w ith peak hour consumption rose up to a maximum of 166 per cent of its initial value, w hile the price of electricity during the day and night w as decreased by a maximum of 13 per cent and 37 per cent respectively. The TOU tariffs w ere designed to be neutral in comparison w ith the standard flat-rate tariff to ensure t hat t he average participant w ho did not change t heir electricity consumption w ould not be financially penalised.
The regulation authority states that " Throughout t he Trial all part icipant s t est ing t ime-of-use t ariffs w ere guarant eed t hat t hey w ould not pay more for t heir elect ricity t han if t hey had been on t he normal Elect ric Ireland t ariff (14.1c per unit ex VAT). Accordingly, all part icipant s received a balancing credit at t he end of t he benchmark period and in January 2011. The small number of individuals w ho incurred cost s above t his average w ere recompensed on a case by case basis" .
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The base TOU tariff (Tariff A) reflects the underlying cost of energy transmission, distribution, generation and supply (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011a). Table 1 sets out the various price levels applying in the control and treatment periods.
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[insert Table 1 here]
In addition, treatment groups were also subjected to one of four information stimuli. 14 In Ireland, electricity customers typically receive bi-monthly paper bills. Households in the treatment group w ere randomly assigned to one of four groups; bi-monthly billing, monthly billing, bi-monthly billing plus IHD stimulus, bi-monthly billing plus overall load reduction (OLR) stimulus. OLR refers to households w ho received €20 (plus their energy savings) if they reached a monthly target (based on 11 For a com plet e descript ion of t he allocat ion betw een st imulus and t ariff groups see Comm ission for Energy
Regulat ion (2011a). 12 These paym ent s ranged from €30 under Tariff A t o €90 under t ariff D (Comm ission for Energy Regulation, 2011 a pp.8). 13 There is som e debat e in t he literat ure over w het her households respond t o average or m arginal prices. It has been argued t hat households respond t o average price, w hich is easily calculat ed and observable (see Alberini et al., 2011 for exam ple). 14 Treatm ent households were also supplied w ith a fridge m agnet (det ailing t he t im e bands and associat ed cost s) and a st icker (det ailing t he t im e bands) (Com mission for Energy Regulation, 2011a).
historic trend minus 10 per cent). As the precise prices faced by households in the OLR group could not be determined, w e excluded these households (n=940) from our analysis. 15 Among the treatment group therefore, 13 distinct groups defined by combinations of the various TOU tariffs and information stimuli are identified. Table 2 outlines the numbers of control and treatment observations available for analysis.
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[insert Table 2 here]
The quality of the data on electricity consumption is very high. Only a small percentage of households w ere excluded due to incomplete records (i.e., due to signal problems impacting on the return of half-hourly smart meter readings). Detailed information on each of the participating households w as also collected, both before and after the trial period. Information on household composition, appliance ow nership and use, as w ell as attitudes tow ards energy conservation and the environment w as collected. As detailed below , w e also examine the response of different household types to the various TOU tariffs and information stimuli. This requires detailed information on household composition and socio-economic status. We use an indicator of the highest level of education completed by the chief income earner of the household in order t o identify different household types as there are some problems w ith other potential indicators.
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As the control period started on the 14 t h of July 2009, w e also exclude the first seven months of the treatment period to correctly estimate household responses to the introduction of tariffs and information stimuli. The final sample size is 967,756 observations, across 2,831 households (768 in the control group, and 2,063 in the treatment group).
The main focus of this paper is the estimation of the reaction of households to different TOU tariffs and different information stimuli. How ever, electricity demand is also affected by other factors. As discussed in Section 2, previous research has highlighted the importance of the w eather and the number of appliances in each household in determining electricity consumption. In addition to price and information stimuli, w e therefore include in our analysis the number of electric appliances ow ned by the household 18 , and proxies for the temperature and climate variables in the form of heating degree days (HDD) and sunshine hours for each individual day over the period 14 July 2009 -15 A sam ple of the inform ation provided w ith t he bills can be found on pp.85 of Commission for Energy
Regulat ion (2011a). 16 Half-hourly dat a w ere aggregated t o daily t ot als. 17 For exam ple, t he indicat or of household income is poorly recorded (m any m issing observat ions, and an analysis of t he summ ary st atist ics indicat es t hat t he wording of the quest ion caused confusion am ong households in relat ion t o w het her responses should be annual, m ont hly or w eekly incom e, or pre-or post -t ax. In addition, inform at ion on the num ber and ages of individuals in t he household did not allow us t o distinguish am ong households wit h children of different ages. 18 For t he appliances we consider t he num bers of w ashing machines, dishw ashers, t um ble dryers, lapt ops and PCs, TVs, elect ric cookers, elect ric showers and st andalone freezers ow ned by each household. In t he heat ing dumm y variable we consider w het her t he household has elect ric heat ing or an electric w at er heating/ pum ping syst em in t he house. The num ber of appliances is st rongly significant in all our est im at ions.
31 December 2010. 19 We also include a categorical variable that indicate the day of the w eek, and a binary variable that indicates public holidays.
M oreover, w e create a dummy variable w hich is equal to 1 for households that have electric heating, and w e interact this variable w ith the HDD indicator, to control for heterogeneity in the response to temperature among households that have different heating methods. In this w ay, w e also control for potential effects on electricity consumption during the months of November and December 2010, w hen it w as unusually cold in Ireland (see Figure 1 ).
Methodology
The main advantage of the experiment conducted on smart metering and TOU pricing in Ireland is that our data are unaffected by the selection bias that usually characterises this type of analysis.
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While initial participation in the experiment w as not random, households w ere subsequently randomly assigned to either the control or treatment groups. This means the sample w as collected w ith the objective that the treatment and the control groups should not have any significant differences apart from the treatment. In order t o test the effectiveness of this approach, w e estimated a probit model in w hich the dependent variable was the probability of being part of the treated group and the independent variables were household characteristics (age of the individual w ho responded to the household questionnaire, appliances used by the household, level of education of the chief income earner of the household). None of these variables proved to be significant at the standard significance levels, as highlighted in Table 3 . M oreover, a comparison of the means of different variables that summarise the household characteristics did not show any significant difference.
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[insert Table 3 here]
As w e also have information from the benchmark period for control and treatment groups, the natural choice of estimator for the reaction to different tariffs and stimuli is the difference-indifference estimator. This technique allow s us to correctly estimate the difference in the means betw een the control and the treatment groups in the treatment period, controlling for common trends across the tw o groups during the control period.
Let us denote  it as the mean of the outcome of the group i at time t , in w hich i is equal to 0 (control group) or 1 (treatment group) and t is equal to 0 (control period) or to 1 (treatment period). As the only difference betw een the households w ho populate our sample is the treatment, w e estimate the difference-in-differences ( − ) , using the random effects estimator for panel data.
19 Inform ation on HDD and sunshine hours is available for Dublin Airport only. In any case, m ore det ailed inform ation on t he regional locat ion of households is not available. 20 See Card and Kruger , 1984) , am ong ot hers. 21 Det ails on request from t he aut hors.
We estimate three different versions of our model: a benchmark case; a model in w hich the sample is divided by the highest education level of the chief income earner of the household; and models in w hich w e distinguish betw een additional household types (based on the age of the survey respondent, and the occupancy status of the household (rent, ow ned outright and ow ned w ith mortgage)).
Impact of different TOU tariffs on electricity demand
In order to test the impact of a change in the tariff structure, given the different information stimuli, w e estimate the follow ing equation:
in w hich , is the daily consumption of electricity in t he three different time of the day (peak, day, night), is the dummy variable indicating that the household w as exposed to tariff A during the treatment period, is the dummy variable indicating that the household w as exposed to tariff B during the treatment period, etc. is the dummy variable indicating that the household w as exposed to the w eekend tariff during the treatment period (this tariff w as applied only to consumers facing the bi-monthly billing information stimulus). is the dummy variable for the treatment period, is the dummy variable for the treated group, is the dummy variable for public holidays, Wkdays are dummies w hich are equal to 1 on the various days of the w eek, HDD is a variable that reflects the heating degree days, sunshine is a variable that reflects sunshine hours (not included in the night specification), Appliances is a count variable of the number of appliances ow ned by the household and ElecHeat is a dummy variable indicating that the household has an electric heating system. The variable HDDElecHeat is a variable that interacts the HDD w ith the ElecHeat dummy; this variable should control for high electricity consumption during the w inter of 2010, in w hich the temperatures in Ireland w ere exceptionally low , as well as the differential response to TOU tariffs among households w ith different heating types. The coefficients − represent our difference-in-difference estimates (i.e., the effect of the four TOU tariffs on household electricity consumption). We estimate nine different specifications of the model, w hich represent different combinations of time of day (peak, day, night) and information stimulus (bimonthly billing, monthly billing, IHD).
The treatment period dummy that w e include in our analysis simply indicates the differences in the dependent variable betw een the control and the treatment period, that is:
. We expect that this variable w ill be negative and significant in all models, as the change in tariffs and information stimuli should lead treated households to be more aw are of their electricity consumption and to take steps to reduce their consumption. On the contrary, w e expect that the treatment group dummy w ill be alw ays insignificant as the treatment and the control groups are not statistically different to each other (as demonstrated above).
Differential response to TOU pricing and information stimuli by household education level
To correctly disentangle the differences in electricity consumption betw een households w ith different socio-economic characteristics w e re-estimate model (1) for different subsamples of the initial sample. The response rate to the income question in the pre-trial survey w as poor, and the information on household composition (e.g., number and ages of children) is not detailed enough to construct a household composition variable. Instead, w e use information on the highest education level of the chief income earner of the household. We disaggregate households on the basis of w hether the chief income earner had a third level qualification or not (38.3 per cent of households are thus classified as 'high education households', w hile 61.7 percent are classified as 'low education households').
The education level of the household (proxied by that of the chief income earner) may have nontrivial effects on electricity consumption during different times of the day: on one hand, high education households may be more concerned about the efficient use of their appliances, and we therefore might observe a higher contraction in consumption during the peak hours among these households than among low education households. On the other hand, education can (at least partially) pick up some of the income effects, and so we might expect that low education households might be more concerned about price than the high education households.
Differential response to TOU pricing and information stimuli by alternative household characteristics
While the education level of the chief income earner is our main indicator of household socioeconomic status, w e also ran the models using alternative household sub-samples. First, w e distinguish betw een households of different ages, as proxied by the age of the survey respondent.
We consider 4 different age groups: young people, aged 18-34; adults aged 35-54; adults in the last stage of their career (55-64) and retired people (i.e., those aged 65+). Second, w e also consider household occupancy status. While acting as a proxy for household resources, this potentially also affects the household reaction to different prices as the inclusion of utility payments in rent may reduce the effectiveness of increasing electricity prices.
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Impact of different TOU tariffs on electricity demand
Tables 4-6 present the results of the difference-in-difference analysis of the introduction of TOU tariffs for the peak, day and night periods respectively (w ith the samples further disaggregated by information stimuli). The treatment period dummy is strongly negative and significant in both the peak and day specifications. The same result emerges from the analysis performed by Faruqui and Sergici (2009) ; how ever, our results are not directly comparable as their study accounts only for differences in the pricing structures before and after the treatment period, w hereas our analysis also assesses the impact of differences in information stimuli. As expected, the consumption of electricity decreases more during peak than day hours. M oreover, in our analysis electricity consumption decreases even during the night hours, but this decline is not statistically significant. As expected, the treatment group dummy is alw ays insignificant, w ith the exception of the night specification w here it is sometimes w eakly significant.
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Variables relating to the day of the w eek are largely significant, and have signs that are consistent w ith expectations (i.e., relative to Wednesdays, peak consumption is low er, and day consumption is higher on w eekends). Peak period electricity consumption is also significantly low er on public holidays (and day consumption correspondingly higher).
The influence of the w eather is highly significant. The effects of HDD and sunshine hours are positive and negative respectively. 24 When HDD is interacted w ith the indicator for electric heating, the effect of HDD is more strongly positive, indicating the particular burden that low temperatures place on those that rely on electric heating. Finally, the number of appliances installed in each house is positive and significant in all the different specifications of the model.
From Table 4 it is clear that consumption during the peak hours is negatively affected by the initial introduction of TOU tariffs. How ever, across the different information stimuli, there are differences in both the magnitude of the effects, and how consumption responds to increasing tariffs. For example, in the peak period model, electricity consumption is alw ays low er under tariff D (with the 22 For t he sm art m et ering experim ent analysed in t his paper, a st at ist ical analysis of t he im pact of t he TOU t ariffs and inform ation st im uli on t ot al and peak dem and was also carried out on behalf of t he Com mission for Energy Regulat ion by The Research Perspect ive and Insight St at ist ical Consult ing (Comm ission for Energy Regulat ion, 2011a). They found t hat overall, t he int roduct ion of t he TOU t ariffs and t he inform ation st imuli result ed in st at ist ically significant reduct ions in t ot al elect ricity consum ption of 2.5 per cent and peak electricit y consum ption of 8.8 per cent . These result s w ere used subsequent ly in t he cost -benefit analysis of t he sm art m et ering t rial. They also found t hat t he stim ulus com bining bi-m ont hly bill, energy usage st at em ent and elect ricit y m onit or w as m ore effective than ot her inform at ion st im uli in reducing peak usage wit h a peak shift of 11.3 per cent , and t hat households w it h higher elect ricit y consumpt ion w ere m ore responsive t o TOU pricing and t he inform at ion st im uli. 23 For t he night specification t his dumm y might include a composit ional difference betw een t he t reatm ent and cont rol groups t hat exist s in t he night t im e (and w hich w as not apparent in t he overall result s present ed in Table 3 ). 24 We exclude t he number of sunshine hours from t he night dem and analysis.
highest ratio of peak to night prices) than under tariff A (with the lowest). In the households w here IHDs are installed, there is a linear relationship betw een the size of the tariff applied and the contraction in electricity consumption. How ever, w hen the stimulus is characterised by the provision of less frequent information (bi-monthly or monthly paper billing), the magnitude of the reduction is different across the different tariffs. For instance, w hen the households receive a bi-monthly bill, the contraction in electricity consumption during the peak is higher under tariff B than tariff A, w hich is plausible. How ever, households that face tariff C do not respond to t he increase in the peak period electricity tariff, although those on tariff D do respond significantly. A similar nonlinearity in the consumption contraction in the peak period under the four different tariffs is associated w ith the monthly billing stimulus, although the pattern is closer to that observed for the IHD stimulus.
Although the IHD stimulus is associated w ith the most consistent -looking price response, it is still w eak in absolute terms. The ratio of peak to night prices rises from about 1.7 in Tariff A to 4.2 in Tariff D as per Table 1 . This is a substantial relative price change. Nevertheless, the associated reduction in peak usage is only 1 per cent for each step change in tariff and a total of 4.5 per cent from Tariff A to D. M ore than a doubling of the peak/ night ratio leads to a reduction of less than 5
per cent in peak demand. These results show some consistency w ith previous research. Reiss and
White (2005) found a non-linear reaction betw een the changes in electricity demand and the applied electricity prices in California. Pollitt and Shaorshadze (2011) and Ito (2010) discuss the possibility that the lack of continuous information might affect consumer reactions. Allcott and M ullainathan (2010) and Allcott (2011) highlight how consumers believes can be systematically biased w hen they are evaluating energy costs.
In the Irish experiment, monthly and bi-monthly billing might not provide sufficient information to households, w ho then cannot regulate their behaviour consistently w ith the tariff applied. In contrast , the provision of real-time information on both t he quantity and cost of electricity consumed via the IHD seems to result in more consistent behaviour among the treatment group households (at least in the peak period). Overall, household responses may be dominated by application of some simple heuristic: they know peak prices are now higher than other times of day and they change behaviour to reflect this, but further increases in the differential are either not fully perceived or evoke only a w eak response for some other reason.
Electricity consumption during the day and night is less responsive to TOU tariffs. As Table 1 highlights, the changes from the control period for the day tariff were quite low (ranging from -2.2 per cent under tariff A to -12.6 per cent under tariff D), so it is perhaps understandable that households did not change their consumption significantly.
In contrast, night tariffs varied from -16.1 per cent to -37.1 per cent than those applying in the control period. How ever, the lack of reaction of the households to TOU pricing in the night period under all the various stimuli may be explained by considering that consumers tend to react more to a price increase than to a price decrease (see Daw es, 2004) . In addition, the night tariff began at 11 p.m, making it difficult to shift the usage of many appliances (cooker, show er and w ashing machine) to these hours.
Differential response to TOU pricing and information stimuli by household education level
To ascertain w hether the response to TOU pricing is different across households w ith different education levels, w e run the models on the subsamples of low education and high education households. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the difference-in-difference analysis for the lowand high education households w ith IHDs respectively.
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Focussing on the peak period first, the results indicate that low education households respond only to higher peak prices w hen receiving a monthly bill, or in possession of an IHD. The reaction of high education households to the peak pricing structure is similar, although the effects are slightly smaller in magnitude, and there is some response to higher peak prices among high education households w ho receive a bi-monthly bill. This suggests once again that regular feedback in the form of an IHD is more effective in reducing peak-period electricity consumption than other stimuli, and the results also provide some evidence to suggest that this effect is stronger for low education households. As w ith the baseline results, day consumption is largely unaffected by TOU pricing. High education households are similarly unaffected by TOU pricing for night consumption, w hile TOU pricing has a significant effect on night consumption for low education households w ho have an IHD. The effects show that decreasing night prices are associated w ith increasing consumption, w hich suggest that low education households w ith an IHD are responding to TOU tariffs by shifting consumption to the night hours. There is no such effect for low education households w ith the bi-monthly or monthly billing options how ever.
Differential response to TOU pricing and information stimuli by alternative household characteristics
Splitting the sample using alternative indicators of household socio-economic status confirms the general results. How ever, some interesting conclusions might be draw n for the age groups and the house occupancy type. First, adults (aged 35-54) are the most responsive to changes in the peak prices, w hen IHD is inst alled. Second, households w ho are renting their apartment seem to be less responsive to change in peak pricing than households w ho live in their ow n houses. The last result can be understood by considering that sometime the rent is inclusive of the utility bills; this affects the incentives in changing the electricity consumption in presence of different tariffs and stimuli.
Discussion, Summar y and Conclusions
The analysis in this paper presents estimates of the response of a sample of Irish households to TOU tariffs and information stimuli in the residential electricity market. The quality of the data, along w ith the careful experimental design, allow s us to examine these issues for the first time in Ireland.
While the impact of TOU tariffs and information stimuli has been examined in other countries, the application to Ireland presents evidence for a country w ith a very different climate to that analysed in most recent analyses (i.e., a temperate climate w ith no household air conditioning).
Our results show that TOU tariffs and information stimuli are effective in influencing electricity consumption. In terms of information stimuli, the provision of an IHD is particularly significant. It must be noted that our results are not directly comparable w ith those of the statistical analysis of the data (Commission for Energy Regulation, 2011a). The statistical analysis involved a before-after analysis of electricity consumption under the different TOU tariffs and information stimuli. In addition, the researchers did not impose any parametric assumptions on the relationship betw een electricity consumption and prices/ information stimuli and they imputed missing values for the cases in w hich electricity consumption readings w ere missing. Our analysis further controls for possible sources of heterogeneity across households (e.g., appliance ow nership), and this allow s us to separate out the pure effect of the variation in the tariffs and the presence of the stimuli from the environmental and household specific characteristics.
Our results are particularly interesting as they highlight how the presence of different TOU tariffs, in combination w ith different information stimuli, affects household electricity consumption during different times of the day. The results of different TOU tariffs indicate that TOU pricing is only statistically significant in influencing household electricity consumption during the peak period. This is not surprising given the sharp increases in peak period prices that w ere observed betw een the control and treatment periods, w hile the changes for the day and night periods w ere much smaller (see Table 1 ). How ever, w e do observe a non-linear response to TOU tariffs for the peak period for households that received a bimonthly or monthly paper bill, in contrast to the results for households w ith an IHD w here the response is linear. The magnitude of the results for monthly paper billing are closer to the results for the IHD stimulus, w hile the results for the bimonthly paper billing option are smaller in magnitude. This is consistent w ith the research noted above that stresses the importance of regular and easily understood feedback in influencing consumer energy use.
While there is a general tendency for peak usage to fall w hen TOU tariffs are in place regardless of information treatment, additional increases in the ratio of peak to night prices only results in limited further absolute decreases in usage. This could imply that w hile households understand that peak prices are higher under the new tariffs, but they do not fully understand how much higher they are under specific plans or that they have little scope to respond to higher prices beyond their initial reaction.
In order to understand how different groups react to the same changes in the TOU tariffs w e split our sample in tw o, considering low and high education households separately. Our results show that, for t he peak period, regular feedback in the form of an IHD is particularly effective in reducing peak-period electricity consumption, and t he results also provide some evidence to suggest that t his effect is stronger for low education households. The fact that high education households respond in a linear w ay to increasing peak prices is consistent w ith the research of Ito (2010) w ho suggests that individuals w ith higher education levels are better able to understand prices and information stimuli.
How ever, the larger magnitude of the effects for low education households and the finding that these households shift electricity consumption tow ards the night period is suggestive of greater price sensitivity on the part of low education households, perhaps due to the correlation betw een education level and income. The fact that the latter effect is significant only for households w ith
IHDs reinforces the importance of easily-understood, instantaneous feedback in influencing electricity consumption.
In the context of European climate policy targets and the importance of matching electricity supply and demand, these results have important policy implications. They indicate that TOU pricing can be effective in influencing peak period household electricity consumption, and suggest than the price response is more consistent w hen accompanied by real-time feedback in the form of an IHD.
How ever, the w eakness of responses to further relative price increases may suggest that the scope for demand response is quickly exhausted or that consumers use simple heuristics w hen considering how to respond. Further research w ill be needed to determine w hich of these mechanisms is most significant. The importance of appropriate information is again highlighted by the different results for households w ith low and high education levels. Not e: t he weekend t ariff was only combined wit h the bi-mont hly billing informat ion st imulus. 
